In a sample of 124 publicly traded Israeli firms in 1994-2001 we find that CEOs who belong to the family or business group that owns most of the firm shares ("owner CEOs") receive significantly (about 50%) higher pay that professional CEOs who do not belong to the control group ("non-owner...

We collect data on CEO pay in 122 closely-held firms traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange during 1995-2001. After estimating CEO pay performance sensitivity and CEO excess pay, we examine how these two pay attributes affect end of period (year 2001) Tobin's Q. Our main findings and conclusions...

We follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 Israeli companies that unified their dual-class shares in the 1990s, and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First, controlling...