Using NYSE TAQ data, we compute MLEs of the primitive parameters of a Kyle-type model, including the variance of fundamentals given only public information, the variance of errors in private signals, and the variance of uninformed liquidity trading (noise). An out of sample test shows that the...

We build a Kyle-type pricing model with earnings and trading signals and estimate its deep parameters - the information advantages of traders and firms, the correlation between the firm and traders' information, and the noise variance. Moment conditions derived from the pricing rule yield a...

This paper provides estimates of overall informational efficiency in futures markets on India's National Stock Exchange. We do not examine the price reaction to any public announcement. Instead, we invoke the Hellwig (1980) model, and exploit the property that for futures contracts the terminal...

We model and estimate analysts' herding propensity with I/B/E/S annual earnings forecast data. Compared to prior studies, our paper has three unique features. First, we estimate analysts' true posterior beliefs of a firm's earnings assuming rational expectations rather than using analysts' own...

We build a simple model of analysts' propensity to herd. Using ideas from GMM and simulated method of moments, we estimate an analyst's herding propensity with I/B/E/S forecast data from 1989-2004. We find that, of the analysts whose herding propensity is defined by our model, 85% of them tend...

A shop-floor supervisor or team leader can raise productivity either directly, by contributing on the line, or indirectly, by helping other team members via training and problem-solving. In this paper, we address the issue of how supervisors allocate their discretionary time between these two...

This paper assesses the importance of the role of prices as aggregators of private information in the Samp;P 500 futures market. We estimate primitive parameters of the Hellwig (1980) noisy rational expectations model, when both prices and terminal values are observable. The variance-covariance...

This paper explains how the actions of skeptical traders can make manipulable earnings reports informative. Our model consists of a price-maximizing manager who chooses a cheap talk report, a profit-maximizing trader who may then seek costly information, and competitive market makers. Since the...

This paper provides a model to explain how suspicion in capital markets may alleviate moral hazard in unverifiable managerial disclosures. We model a stylized market as a non-cooperative game among three classes of agents: competitive risk-neutral market makers who set prices; a manager with...