As search frictions become smaller in the market for a consumer product, buyers are able to locate and access more sellers per unit of time. In response, sellers choose to design varieties of the product that are more specialized in order to exploit differences in the buyers' preferences. I find...

I study a version of the search-theoretic model of imperfect competition by Burdett and Judd (1983) in which sellers face a strictly increasing rather than a constant marginal cost of production. The equilibrium exists and is unique, and its structure depends on the extent of search frictions....

I study a search equilibrium model of the labor market in which workers have stubborn beliefs about their labor market prospects, i.e. beliefs about their probability of finding a job and the wage they will earn that do not respond to aggregate fluctuations in fundamentals. I show that, when...

There are two facts about the world that we take as given: First the "law of one price" is false -- one can find many different prices for what appears to be, beyond reasonable doubt, the same good. Second, prices are set in nominal terms and appear, beyond reasonable doubt, to be sticky -- some...

We propose a novel theory of self-ful?lling ?uctuations in the labor market. A ?rm employing an additional worker generates positive externalities on other ?rms, because employed workers have more income to spend and have less time to shop for low prices than unemployed workers. We quantify...

Consider a labor market in which firms want to insure existing employees against income fluctuations and, simultaneously, want to recruit new employees to fill vacant jobs. Firms can commit to a wage policy, i.e. a policy that specifies the wage paid to their employees as a function of tenure,...