This paper characterizes optimal pay-performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for managers who have private information about their skills, and those skills affect their outside employment opportunities. The model presumes that the rate at which a manager's opportunity wage increases...

We study a setting wherein a divisional manager undertakes personally costly effort to improve the profitability of an investment project. The manager's choice of innovation effort is subject to a holdup problem because of the ex post opportunism on the part of headquarters. We analyze and...

This survey advocates the use of dynamic models to examine the incentive properties of commonly used accounting performance metrics. Drawing from recent work in this emerging field, the survey illustrates how one can use tractable multiperiod models to shed light on questions of fundamental...

We examine alternative performance measures for a manager who has superior information about the profitability of an investment project and who contributes to periodic operating cash flows through his efforts. We find that residual income based on a suitably chosen depriation schedule is an...