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We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for each jurisdiction/club is unrestricted in size. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs, which simply ensures that equal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468854
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005381130
We consider a model of a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding that distinguishes between the tastes and crowding characteristics of agents. Crowding characteristics are those aspects of an agent that have a direct external effect on other members of the coalition to which he...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898162
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs we demonstrate nonemptiness of the core of the economy. We then demonstrate that the equal treatment core coincides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005106300
We reconsider the classic puzzle of why election turnouts are persistently so high even though formal analysis strongly suggests that rational agents should not vote. If we assume that voters are not making systematic mistakes, the most plausible explanation seems to be that agents receive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005583030
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for each jurisdiction/club is unrestricted in size. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs, which simply ensures that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595878
The 'crowding types' model of a local public goods economy makes a distinction between crowding effects and tastes of agents. Decentralization of the core is possible both with anonymous admission prices that depend only on publicly observable information and, when technology is linear, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005608933
We consider the classic puzzle of why people turn out for elections in substantial numbers even though formal analysis strongly suggests that rational agents would not vote. If one assumes that voters do not make systematic mistakes, the most plausible explanation seems to be that agents receive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752736
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for each jurisdiction/club is unrestricted in size. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs, which simply ensures that equal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008521761
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005143333