Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- I History -- 1 The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments: Toward a Political Economy of Implementation -- 2 The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution -- 3 Institutions and the Resource Curse in...

In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority, no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and multiple, overlapping levels of jurisdiction. By 1800, Europe had consolidated into a handful of powerful, centralized nation states. We...

Witnesses accounts are used to analyse changes in working hours between 1750 and 1800. Two findings stand out. The paper demonstrates that the information contained in witnesses accounts allows us to reconstruct historical time-budgets, and provides extensive tests of the new method. It also...

Why did England industrialize first? And why was Europe ahead of the rest of the world? Unified growth theory in the tradition of Galor and Weil (2000, American Economic Review, 89, 806–828) and Galor and Moav (2002, Quartely Journal of Economics, 177(4), 1133–1191) captures the key features...

For most of the post-war period, Europe's capital markets remained largely closed to international capital flows. This paper explores the costs of this policy. Using an event-study methodology, I examine the extent to which restrictions of current and capital account convertibility affected...

This paper constructs simple models in which industrialization is driven by human capital accumulation. Industrialization can explain the robust correlation between equipment investment and growth in developing countries. We show that government intervention is justified within our stylized...

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times on his short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a common view in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-case scenario...

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts of over 50% of GDP. He also failed to honor them four times. We ask what allowed the sovereign to borrow much while defaulting often. Earlier work emphasized either banker irrationality or the importance of sanctions, in line with Bulow and Rogoff (1989)....