Explore the practice of offering subscribers enticements to switch suppliers. This type of competition is natural in subscription markets for homogeneous goods and services. Efficiency is impaired because subscribers are induced to expend resources changing suppliers. Subscription markets are...

Personal privacy is studied in the context of a competitive product (or labor) market. In the first stage of the game, firms that sell homogeneous goods or services (e.g., insurance, credit, or rental housing) post prices they promise to charge approved applicants. In the second stage, each...

In this paper, we investigate two questions. First, we explore which entity (the NHTSA or the manufacturer) is more likely to initiate a given auto safety recall campaign. Second, we analyze the determinants of owner response rates to safety recalls. Our data spans nineteen years (1980-1998) for...

Consumer privacy and the market for customer information in electronic retailing are investigated. The value of customer information derives from the ability of firms to identify individual consumers and charge them personalized prices. Two settings are studied, a closed privacy regime in which...

We study a dynamic coordination game with incomplete information in which players may either be active or inactive. All players initially possess the same information and begin by coordinating on a high level of activity. As the game progresses, agents have different experiences and update...

This article summarizes and draws connections among diverse streams of theoretical and empirical research on the economics of privacy. We focus on the economic value and consequences of protecting and disclosing personal information, and on consumers' understanding and decisions regarding the...

An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront...

We study a continuous-time organization design problem. Each member's output is an imperfect signal of his underlying choice of effort, and each member's utility from remaining in the organization is endogenous to the output of other agents. Monetary transfers are assumed infeasible. Incentives...