We find that the directorial labor market's ability to align the incentives of managers and shareholders depends on the aggregate level of investor protection in a country. If a country's corporate governance environment is strong and boards are likely to protect the interest of shareholders, a...

We find that the strength of countries' legal institutions can explain the ability of private firms to identify and terminate poorly performing managers. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that governance problems in private firms are ameliorated by strong institutions that reduce...

This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list its shares in the U.S. is related to the concentration of the ownership of its cash flow rights and of its control rights. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to...

Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 43 countries, we investigate whether laws and regulations as well as votes cast by U.S. institutional investors are consistent with an effective shareholder voting process. We find that laws and regulations allow for meaningful votes to be cast as...

We study the economic consequences of a recent securities regulation that grants U.S. regulators broad new powers to revise or reject foreign acquisitions of firms deemed critical to U.S. national security. Our results document an important tradeoff between U.S. national security and shareholder...

We study the economic consequences of a recent Securities and Exchange Commission securities regulation change that grants foreign firms trading on the U.S. over-the-counter (OTC) market an automatic exemption from the reporting requirements of the 1934 Securities Act. We document that the...

This paper examines the impact of currency derivatives on firm value using a broad sample of firms from thirty-nine countries with significant exchange-rate exposure. Derivatives can be used for managers' self-interest, for hedging or for speculative purposes. We hypothesize that investors can...

We examine the first significant deregulation of U.S. disclosure requirements since the passage of the 1933/1934 Exchange and Securities Acts: the 2007 SEC Rule 12h-6. Rule 12h-6 has made it easier for foreign firms to deregister with the SEC and thereby terminate their U.S. disclosure...

This paper uses a sample of over 2,500 firms from 27 countries to investigate the relation between ownership structure, analyst following, investor protection and valuation. We find that analysts are less likely to follow firms with potential incentives to withhold or manipulate information,...

This paper investigates the relation between cross listing in the U.S., with its resulting commitment to increased disclosure, and the information environment of non-U.S. firms. We find that firms that cross-list on U.S. exchanges have greater analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy...