The role of institutional investors on the register constitutes a significant puzzle. Concentrated investors could intervene (i.e., exercise 'voice') so as to improve firm governance mechanisms. Alternatively, acting as informed traders, they could effectively discipline management if they adopt...

We investigate several implications of activism by institutional investors/monitors in the microstructure equilibrium postulated by Noe (2002). The decision whether or not to monitor, which reveals the firm's value to the fund, is stochastic. Empirically, we show that net-of-transaction-cost...

Utilizing a database of daily institutional fund manager trades, we examine the contribution of strategic trading at quarter-end associated with potential 'portfolio pumping' or 'ramping up' of reported stock prices around quarter ends. We provide the first direct evidence that active fund...

In a sequence of trades in the same direction across fund managers, we expect the long-term return of a trade to be increasing in the number of subsequent trades if fund managers' trading is driven by private information. In contrast, information cascades imply the lack of such a relationship....

Using unique daily fund manager trade data, we examine the role of institutional trading in influencing firm performance. We show that short-horizon informed trading by multiple institutional investors effectively disciplines corporate management. Our focus is on short-term ldquo;swingrdquo;...

Utilizing a database of daily institutional fund manager trades, we examine the contribution of strategic trading at quarter-end associated with potential 'portfolio pumping' or 'ramping up' of reported stock prices around quarter-ends. We provide the first direct evidence that active fund...