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We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament prizes do not differ between the workers(uniform prizes), as in the previous tournament literature, the outcome will be ineffcient. In the case of limited liability, the employer may benefit from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333787
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifiable performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333984
We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is inefficient. Even if market concentration and technological...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334066
We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is ine? cient. Even if market concentration and technological...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263178
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifi- able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264908
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003822196
We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is ineØ cient. Even if market concentration and technological...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003421145
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008667015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003993458
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifi- able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003576494