Recent research has proposed several ways in which overconfident traders can persist in competition with rational traders. This paper offers an additional reason: overconfident traders do better than purely rational traders at exploiting mispricing caused by liquidity or noise traders. We...

This paper constructs a one-period model of a reporting game where the manager is risk neutral and the asset market is perfectly competitive. The manager chooses the level of the accounting earnings to report to the market in order to influence the market value of the firm. The reported earnings...

This paper constructs a model of a standard setting game among informed and uninformed investors, an auditor and standard setters to examine how accounting standard setting interacts with informed and uninformed investors' investment decisions. It proves that the levels of investments of...

This paper presents an one-period model of an one-asset market allowing for the strategic interaction among rational traders and earnings fixated traders. Earnings fixated traders are functionally fixated on the reported earnings numbers in formulating their trading strategies without paying...

This paper presents a static model of a competitive securities market. In the market there are two assets: risk-free asset and risky asset. The payoff of the risk-free asset is one and the payoff of the risky asset is unknown. Rational traders correctly estimate the mean and variance of the...

This paper examines how the investor's belief about the project's ability of generating cash flow affects accounting standard setting. It proves analytically that the accounting standard in the Stackelberg equilibrium of the static model increases with the increase in the investor's belief about...