We perform an asset market experiment in order to test the central result coming from the new overconfidence models, namely that high levels of overconfidence lead to enhanced trading activity. We find that overconfidence does engender additional trade. Unlike previous experimental or...

Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Conservatism bias and asset price overreaction or underreaction to new information in a competitive securities market -- Chapter 3 Conservatism bias and asset price overreaction or underreaction to new information in the presence of strategic interaction --...

1. Evolution, Irrationality and Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium -- 2. Evolution, Irrationality and Monopolistically Competitive Equilibrium -- 3. Evolution and Informationally Efficient Equilibrium in a Commodity Futures Market -- 4. Natural Selection, Random Shocks and Market Efficiency in a...

Profit maximization is the usual prerequisite for achievement of a perfectly competitive equilibrium. However, for a long time it has been thought that this principle of profit maximization can be replaced by natural selection. This paper shows analytically that with the market selection...

This paper uses an evolutionary approach to explain the origin of money as media of exchange in a primitive economy, where agents specialize in production for the purpose of trading for their own consumption goods. A general class of dynamics, which is consistent with Darwinian dynamics, is...

This article begins by proposing a random taste parameterization of a quadratic extension of the PIGLOG demand system at the household level, which is consistent with exact aggregation. This variation in tastes is a random function of household characteristics. The econometric implication is...

This paper builds an evolutionary model of an industry where firms produce differentiated products. Firms have different average cost functions and different demand functions. Firms are assumed to be totally irrational in the sense that firms enter the industry regardless of the existence of...

This paper constructs a one-period model of a reporting game where the manager is risk neutral and the asset market is perfectly competitive. The manager chooses the level of the accounting earnings to report to the market in order to influence the market value of the firm. The reported earnings...

This paper constructs a model of a standard setting game among informed and uninformed investors, an auditor and standard setters to examine how accounting standard setting interacts with informed and uninformed investors' investment decisions. It proves that the levels of investments of...

This paper presents an one-period model of an one-asset market allowing for the strategic interaction among rational traders and earnings fixated traders. Earnings fixated traders are functionally fixated on the reported earnings numbers in formulating their trading strategies without paying...