Showing 231 - 240 of 306
This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others. Thus, experiementation produces a public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005797436
We build a simple model of trust as an equilibrium phenomenon, departing from standard "selfish" preferences in a minimal way. Agents who are on the receiving end of an other to transact can choose whether to cheat and take away the entire surplus, taking into account a "cost of cheating." The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511630
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006775249
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126685
We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126690
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126706
A common interest game is a game in which there exists a unique pair of payoffs which strictly Pareto dominates all other payoffs. The authors consider the undiscounted repeated game obtained by the infinite repetition of such a two-player stage game. They show that, if supergame strategies are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129819
This paper examines an equilibrium model of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about its past. We show that incorrect social memory is a key ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005009770
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061919