This paper considers a credit mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium (CE). It is shown that in general there exists a quot;price-normalizingquot; bundle, with which the enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to appropriate penalties...

A credit mechanism is considered that selects a unique competitive equilibrium (CE) of an exchange economy. It is shown that a price normalization calling for a fixed monetary value for the total wealth in the economy and the addition of appropriate default penalties together result in a...

An adequate description of economic dynamics requires the introduction of a monetary system including default penalties and expectations in a society whose economy utilizes money and credit. This essay notes and discusses several of the factors involved in the use of money and credit in a...

We consider a network game based on matching pennies with two types of agents, conformists and rebels. Conformists prefer to match the action taken by the majority of her neighbors while rebels like to match the minority. We investigate the simultaneous best response dynamic focusing on the...

Games with strategic substitutes (GSS) are generally less tractable than games with strategic complements (GSC). This paper revisits the GSC versus GSS comparison by establishing a novel connection between them. We show through a network perspective that, when the strategy set of each player is...

We consider bargaining problems with compact star-shaped choice sets arising from a class of economic bargaining environments. Convex or comprehensive (relative to the disagreement point) problems are star-shaped but not conversely. We characterize single-valued solutions satisfying the Nash...

We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specifications of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the Nash and egalitarian solutions as...

Shapley (1955) introduced the model of an abstract market game as a generalization of the assignment game model, among several other models. He conjectured that abstract market games possess non-empty cores. We analyze properties of abstract market games and provide a proof of this conjecture...

Every abstract type of a belief-closed type space corresponds to an infinite belief hierarchy. But only finite order of beliefs is necessary for most applications. As we demonstrate, many important insights from the recent development of Bayesian game theory with higher-order uncertainty involve...