This paper studies lying in a simple framework. An agent first randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then claim to have observed any number from the set, receiving a monetary payoff based only on her report. Consistent with previous findings, our participants do not...

Given n agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions who wish to divide m commodities, consider the n-person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave, increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution. It is...

This paper provides characterization theorems for preferences that can be represented by the minimum, the maximum, and the sum of components, or combinations of these forms. It contains a discussion of applications to social choice

I study a two-parameter family of rules governing the process of entry into a club. There are three types of agent: candidates desire to enter the club; judges vote on who should enter; elite are already in the club. Promotion requires that at least n of N judges agree that a candidate is at...

I observe that yardstick competition does not assist a regulator when lump-sum transfers are not costly and the regulator does not care about the distribution of income. Yardstick competition discourages investment that would make efficient operation possible. I characterize optimal regulatory...

This paper models the process of promotion or entry into a club. The paper studies a two-parameter family of promotion models. Promotion requires that at least n of the N judges think that the candidate is at least as good as r of the R members in the current group of promoted agents. Candidates...

I present a model in which relative standing determines the level of achievement needed to pass a test. A candidate passes a test (or gains the credential) provided that his performance compares favorably to people who have passed the test recently. I argue that standards are likely to decline...

This chapter presents some of the main developments in the theory of market signaling and its connection to noncooperative game theory. One of the most important applications of game theory to micro-economics has been in the domain of market signaling. The standard story is a simple one: for...