Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two dierent leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared to...

Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria when the exporting country sets quantity rather than price. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by...

Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared...

This article formulates a reciprocal market model of international duopoly with network externalities to reconsider welfare effects of reductions in transport costs and tariffs. Depending on the magnitude of network externalities, we show two possibilities. One of them, which emerges under...

Recent empirics report that transport cost reductions significantly contribute to rapidly growing world trade. This article develops a reciprocal market model of intra-industry trade with transboundary pollution from consumption to consider how market integration in the form of transport cost...

Developing a two-country model of international mixed oligopoly, this note makes clear the determinant of trade patterns. We give a simple formula to predict bilateral patterns of trade which relates the degree of a country's privatization and the trading country''s competitiveness. If a...

We develop the following Stackelberg game model of dynamic duopoly with sticky prices the leader chooses its time profile of outputs to maximize the discounted sum of proftis, while the follower chooses the optimal output to maximize the instantaneous profit as a myopic profit maximizer at each...

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework,...