We consider informed traders in a limit order market for a single asset. The asset has a common value; in addition, each trader has a private value for it. Traders randomly arrive at the market, after choosing whether to purchase information about the common value. They may either post prices or...

We model endogenous information acquisition in a limit order market for a single financial asset. The asset has a common value; in addition, each trader has a private value for it. Traders randomly arrive at the market, after choosing whether to purchase information about the common value. They...

We model a dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game. Since the model is analytically intractable, we provide an algorithm based on Pakes and McGuire (2001) to find a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium. Given the stationary equilibrium, we generate artificial time series and...

We model a dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game with rational traders. Since the model is analytically intractable, we provide an algorithm based on <link rid="b43">Pakes and McGuire (2001)</link> to find a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium. We then generate artificial time series and perform...

We consider a dynamic limit order market in which traders optimally choose whether to acquire information about the asset and the type of order to submit. We numerically solve for the equilibrium and demonstrate that the market is a "volatility multiplier": prices are more volatile than the...

We model a dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game. Since the model is analytically intractable, we provide an algorithm based on Pakes McGuire (2001) to find a stationary equilibrium, we generate artifical time series and perform comparative dynamics. As we know the data...