In this paper we survey several cross-section studies of cartels and a large sample of case studies of cartels in individual industries. We compare the findings of these studies of cartel activity from the 1800s through the 1980s with the characteristics of a sample of international cartels from...

In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork discusses policy responses to naked and ancillary price fixing as well as vertical restraints. Empirical research finds that vertical restraints are generally welfare-enhancing. We examine cartels that used vertical restraints to support collusion. We find...

This paper analyzes all Section 1, Sherman Act price fixing cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice between 1961 and 2013. Over 500 cartels were prosecuted during this period. The determinants of cartel formation and cartel breakup are estimated, including analysis of the impact of the...

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the limited immunity for export cartels offered by the United States' Export Trading Company Act (1982). We have assembled a data set of 195 Export Trade Certificates of Review - all those created from when the first certificate was granted in 1983...

With the decline of government-imposed trade barriers policymakers have given greater attention to the international distortions created by the practices of private firms, including cartels. We critically evaluate the techniques used in the economic literature to estimate the effects of these...

The enforcement record of the 1990s shows that private international cartels are not defunct--nor do they always fall quickly under the weight of their own incentive problems. Of a sample of 40 such cartels prosecuted by the United States and the European Union in the 1990s, 24 lasted at least...