1. General Introduction -- 1.1. Informal description of games and game theory -- 1.2. Dynamic programming -- 1.3. Subgame perfect equilibria -- 1.4. Sequential equilibria and perfect equilibria -- 1.5. Perfect equilibria and proper equilibria -- 1.6. Essential equilibria and regular equilibria...

This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory (that of Nash equilibria) and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts (such as sequential, perfect, proper and stable equilibria) that have been introduced to overcome...

Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories...

1 Introduction -- 1.1 Informal Description of Games and Game Theory -- 1.2 Dynamic Programming -- 1.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibria -- 1.4 Sequential Equilibria and Perfect Equilibria -- 1.5 Perfect, Proper and Persistent Equilibria -- 1.6 Essential Equilibria and Regular Equilibria -- 2 Games in...