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We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...
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We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010415920
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We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010949104
We consider a two-stage location-price Hotelling model where the consumers can only buy from one direction, as presented by Kharbach (2009, Economics Bulletin). We show that the equilibrium outcome derived by Kharbach does not constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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