In this note I show that there is a mistake in the proof of uniqueness in Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber’s seminal “Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information” and provide a correct proof.

This paper provides two representation theorems for time preferences. They both cover as special cases a variety of time preference models considered in the experimental and theoretical literatures on intertemporal choice. In particular, similarity relations on time and outcomes, exponential,...

Policemen are known to support colleagues who are the subject of criminal investigations. Although we might expect guilty officers to defend each other, why do (otherwise) law-abiding policemen defend those who have broken the law? We investigate under what conditions it is in the interest of a...

TB

We study axiomatically the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. It is shown that, when the prize space is a compact metric space, a preference...

We analyze how the entry of less informed participants in a market for a risky asset affects the volatility of the price of the asset. In an endogenous participation model, we show that in equilibrium the new market entrants are less informed than the rest of the participants. We study how...

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the...