While there have been vast discussion on the materialistic benefits of continuous improvement from the Toyota and Honda experiences, the academic literature pays little attention to information sharing. In this paper, we construct a dynamic adverse selection model in which the supplier privately...

In this paper, we consider a model with a monopoly firm who sells social goods sequentially to a group of customers in a network. We show that, with symmetric social interactions, the optimal pricing under arbitrary launch sequence is independent of customers' network positions, the launch...

We consider a network model where individuals exert efforts in two types of activities that are interdependent. These activities can be either substitutes or complements. We provide a full characterization of the Nash equilibrium of this game for any network structure. We show, in particular,...

We study pricing strategies of competing firms that sell heterogeneous products to consumers in a social network. Goods are substitutes and there are network externalities between neighboring consumers. We show that there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium where, in the first stage,...

This work is motivated by the common practice of add-on pricing, where an add-on is not valuable unless purchased together with the main service. For example, many restaurants serve free bread or complimentary drinks (add-on) while diners are waiting for their entrees (main service) to be...

Resale of used products may shrink the new-product market and create the cannibalization problem. This problem is exacerbated in the digital goods market because copies of digital goods can be perfect substitutes of the original. Many digital goods/service producers take advantage of technology...

Firms are increasingly adopting installment services to help consumers purchase the product, especially in the context of COVID-19. This paper investigates the firm’s installment service interest and price decisions when it can choose to operate installment service directly (i.e.,...