Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential signals that stochastically depend on the actual state of nature. These signal not only provide the players with partial information about the state of nature but also serve...

Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on the actual state of nature. These signals provide the players with partial information about the state of nature and may also serve as a...

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

In a decision problem with uncertainty a decision maker receives partial information about the actual state via an information structure. After receiving a signal he is allowed to withdraw and get 0. We say that one structure is weakly better than another if it may never happen that the latter...

A likelihood order is defined over linear subspaces of a finite dimensional Hilbert space. It is shown that such an order that satisfies some plausible axioms can be represented by a quantum probability in two cases: pure state and uniform measure

A likelihood order is defined over linear subspaces of a finite dimensional Hilbert space. It is shown that such an order that satisfies some plausible axioms can be represented by a quantum probability in two cases: pure state and uniform measure.