The author proposes modeling boundedly rational agents as agents who are not logically omniscient, that is, who do not know all logical or mathematical implications of what they know. He shows how a subjective state space can be derived as part of a subjective expected utility representation of...

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It seems inconsistent to model boundedly rational action choice by assuming that the agent chooses the optimal decision procedure. This criticism is not avoided by assuming that he chooses the optimal procedure to choose a procedure to . . . to choose an action. The author shows that, properly...

Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a weaker form than is...

Recent evolutionary models have introduced 'small mutation rates' as a way of refining predictions of long-run behavior. The authors show that this refinement effect can only be obtained by restrictions on how the magnitude of the effect of mutation on evolution varies across states of the...