Showing 1 - 10 of 12
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332134
We examine the welfare effects of product-line restrictions, such as those called for by some proponents of network neutrality regulation. We find that restricting a monopoly supplier to a single product has the following effects: (a) consumers who would otherwise have consumed a low-quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538427
Both senders and receivers of telecommunications messages derive benefits, creating the possibility of externalities. We explore whether intercarrier compensation (i.e., access charges) can induce carriers to internalize these external effects. In important settings, access charges are...
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This paper explores leadership within organizations. Leadership is distinct from authority because following a leader is a voluntary, rather than coerced, activity of the followers. This paper considers how a leader induces rational agents to follow her in situations when the leader has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005821091
How can boards be chosen through a process partially controlled by the CEO, yet, in many instances, still be effective monitors of him? The authors offer an answer based on a model in which board effectiveness is a function of its independence. This, in turn, is a function of negotiations...
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The authors examine the effects of renegotiation in an agency relationship. They show how renegotiation affects (1) the set of actions the principal can induce the agent to take and (2) the cost of implementing a given action. The authors show that, when the principal receives an unverifiable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699838
This article discusses the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005436353