We analyze the link between entry and R&D spending distribution. We consider a monopolistic competitive market with free entry in which firms can invest in cost-cutting R&D by paying a fixed cost first. For an intermediate level of fixed cost, there is a unique equilibrium in which the market...

Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished from standard ones by the patents being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption--that is, they are club goods. This affects the way coalitional bidding impacts auction...

We analyze the link between industry size and Ramp;D spending distribution. We consider amonopolistically competitive market in which firms can invest in cost-cutting Ramp;D by paying a fixed cost first. For an intermediate level of fixed cost, there is a unique equilibrium in which the market...

We analyze the link between entry and Ramp;D spending distribution. We consider a monopolistic competitive market with free entry in which firms can invest in cost-cutting Ramp;D by paying a fixed cost first. For an intermediate level of fixed cost, there is a unique equilibrium in which the...

Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption{that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction...