This paper offers a model to study the trade-off between the efficiency enhancements of information exchanges and the risk of information leakage in organizations. Information exchanges can be efficient since, in the absence of legal enforcement, the voluntary disclosure of personal information...

This paper uses a new data set on child-adoption matching to estimate the preferences of potential adoptive parents over U.S.-born and unborn children relinquished for adoption. We identify significant preferences favoring girls and unborn children close to birth, and against African-American...

We address the problem faced by innovators who have an idea for a marketable product butmust hire employees to bring the product to the market. Information leakage implies that newly hired employees become informed of the idea and may attempt to bring the product to the market themselves. We...

We examine how the structure of terror networks varies with legal limits on interrogation and the ability of authorities to extract information from detainees. We assume that terrorist networks are designed to respond optimally to a trade-off caused by information exchange: Diffusing information...

The focus of this paper is the endogenous formation of peer groups. We study a model in which agents choose their peers prior to making decisions on multiple issues. Agents differ in how much they value the decision outcomes on one issue relative to another. While each individual can collect...

We consider a securities market with bid-ask spreads at any period, including liquidation. Although the minimum-cost super-replication problem is non-linear, we introduce an auxiliary problem that allows us to characterize no-arbitrage via linear programming techniques. Since no-arbitrage per se...

We address the problem faced by innovators who have an idea for a marketable product but must hire employees to bring the product to the market. However, newly hired employees learn the idea and may attempt to bring the product to the market themselves. We develop a bargaining model that...

This paper offers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of Ramp;D investment of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and in-house production in the presence of Ramp;D information leakage. A contractor hired by a firm learns the firm's technology and can diffuse the...

We analyze a model of bargaining over new ideas. The model accounts for the problem of information leakage, i.e., the diffusion of information about the idea before and after the idea is implemented. We analyze the effects of information leakage on the distribution of rents within firms and the...

This paper offers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of investment in Ramp;D of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and quot;in-housequot; production in the presence of Ramp;D information leakage. A contractor hired by a firm learns the firmacirc;not;quot;s...