A weighted scoring rule, Rule L, on three alternative elections selects the winner by awarding 1 point to each voter's first ranked candidate, L points to the second ranked candidate, and zero to the third ranked candidate. The Condorcet winner is the candidate that would defeat each other...

The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists....

Utility, Preference, Individual Choice, Subjective Probability, and Measurement -- Entropy-Related Measures of the Utility of Gambling -- Altruistic Utility Functions for Joint Decisions -- SSB Preferences: Nonseparable Utilities or Nonseparable Beliefs -- Decision Making Based on Risk-Value...