The paper focus on secondary prevention (diagnostic screening, medical examination, chech-up…) which refers to the early detection of disese. In particular secondary prevention in analyzed as an instrument of self-isurance: if illness occurs, the negative health shock decrease. Both the case...

We study a situation where the government influences consumers` behavior by providing both information and incentives. More generally, we propose a methodology for solving models of signl cum cheap talk. We develop the case of consumption choice in the presence of uncertainty nd external...

I compare in-kind reimbursement and reimbursement insurance. I explicitly consider outpatient and inpatient care in a model where illness has a negative impact on labor productivity. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to intensity of preferences for treatment which is their private...

Comparative advertising content differs from generic. We discover that dissipative advertising has consequences depending upon content and cost. Comparison advertising may trigger legal action by rival …rms that are named. In the model an entrant signals its product quality. By a comparative...

I compare in-kind reimbursement (which fixes treatment quantities) and reimbursement insurance (which fixes treatment prices) as demandside, cost-containment measures. In the model, illness has a negative impact on labor productivity and public insurance is financed through labor income...