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The paper proposes a way to measure mechanical and psychological effects of majority runoff versus plurality electoral systems in candidate elections. Building on a series of laboratory experiments, we evaluate these effects with respect to the probability of electing a Condorcet winner...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010852305
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465255
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511625
The paper proposes a way to measure mechanical and psychological effects of majority runoff versus plurality electoral systems in candidate elections. Building on a series of laboratory experiments, we evaluate these effects with respect to the probability of electing a Condorcet winner...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010714013
The paper proposes a way to measure the mechanical and psychological effects of majority runoff versus plurality. Building on a series of laboratory experiments on presidential-type elections, we evaluate these effects with respect to the probability of election of a centrist candidate. In our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914757
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Nous proposons un modèle de vote stratégique dans lequel la décision de supporter ou non un candidat dépend de B, le bénéfice associé à l'élection de ce candidat, et de V, la viabilité perçue du candidat. Nous testons ce modèle sur des données obtenues lors d'une série...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794334