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This paper investigates the choice between delegation and centralization within political institutions in the presence of lobbying. Our legislature is composed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. The floor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029602
This paper is the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of how different gender balance initiatives in Europe have impacted firms' board structure. Our sample covers 18 countries over the period 2005-2018. We propose a novel indicator of the strictness of the country's gender balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013298288
We review the most recent contributions to the literature on the role of diversity in corporate finance. We focus on gender diversity but also includes various other dimensions of diversity, and analyses its impact on different aspects of corporate life, including performance, CSR strategy and...
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Using a mechanism design approach, we derive endogenously the optimal IPO mechanism when institutional investors are risk averse. We show that the optimal allocation rule is such that all the institutional investors with sufficiently good information are allocated a positive quantity of shares...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533456
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This paper studies the internal organizational design of political institutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature as composed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. The floor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented. The policy outcome is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137098
We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights involved by a lead blockholder of the target firm (the incumbent). We assume that the incumbent has the power to bargain with the potential bidders to set a minimum takeover price. We characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137147