American and Bermudan-type financial instruments are often priced with specific Monte Carlo techniques whose efficiency critically depends on the effective dimensionality of the problem and the available computational power. In our work we focus on Bermudan Swaptions, well-known interest rate...

We revisit the problem of pricing and hedging plain vanilla single-currency interest rate derivatives using multiple distinct yield curves for market coherent estimation of discount factors and forward rates with different underlying rate tenors. Within such double-curve-single-currency...

Once upon a time there was a classical financial world in which all the Libors were equal. Standard textbooks taught that simple relations held, such that, for example, a 6 months Libor Deposit was replicable with a 3 months Libor Deposits plus a 3x6 months Forward Rate Agreement (FRA), and that...

We present a quantitative study of the markets and models evolution across the credit crunch crisis. In particular, we focus on the fixed income market and we analyze the most relevant empirical evidences regarding the divergences between Libor and OIS rates, the explosion of Basis Swaps...

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...

We present an international trade model with multiproduct firms. Firms are heterogeneously endowed with two types of capabilities that jointly determine the trade-off within firms between managing a large portfolio of products and producing at low marginal cost. The model can explain many of the...

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts...

We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we...

We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...