This paper studies competing mechanism games with no restrictions on the complexity of mechanisms where principals can announce mechanisms and agents select and communicate with at most one principal. It proposes the solution concept of robust quasi ex-post equilibrium in which agents'...

This paper studies pre-match investment competition with upper and lower bounds on feasible transfers to sellers in a general signaling environment, where the types of buyers and sellers are private information and the surplus may depend on both types and investments. Bounded transfers create...

This paper proposes a tractable competing mechanism game where each seller simultaneously posts a trading contract that specifies a menu of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) direct mechanisms conditional on an array of messages sent by buyers, and each seller subsequently chooses a...

Abstract This paper studies implicit pricing of non-wage job characteristics in the labor market using a two-sided matching model. It departs from the previous literature by allowing worker heterogeneity in productivity, which gives rise to a double transaction problem in a hedonic model....

This paper studies costly pre-CEO executive skill accumulation by executives, followed by stable matching between firms and CEOs. An increase in the heterogeneity of firm size relative to executive type induces a decrease in the informational effect of skill accumulation, resulting in...

This paper studies costly pre-CEO executive skill accumulation by executives, followed by stable matching between firms and CEOs. An increase in the heterogeneity of firm size relative to executive type induces a decrease in the informational effect of skill accumulation, resulting in...

We develop a model of the labor market where firms incur an adjustment cost when one of their workers quits, and males and females form households assortatively by skill. We show how this environment can lead to an economy where females earn less and drop out more frequently than equally skilled...

This paper develops an equilibrium matching model for a competitive CEO market in which CEOs’ wage and perks are both endogenously determined by bargaining between firms and CEOs. In stable matching equilibrium, firm size, wage, perks and talent are all positively related. Perks are more...

We propose a general method that allows the identification of the policy maker’s unobserved preferences when setting different excise tax rates to differentiated products. We use it to evaluate excise beer tax policy in the Canadian province of Ontario, identifying the government’s...