We apply the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (Q J Econ 119(3):861–898, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2004</CitationRef>)—where players have different levels of reasoning—to Huck et al. (Games Econ Behav 38:240–264, <CitationRef CitationID="CR12">2002</CitationRef>) discrete version of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ Behav 2:29–46, <CitationRef CitationID="CR19">1990</CitationRef>) action commitment...</citationref></citationref></citationref>

We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which play- ers can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie and the expected effectiveness of a player?s theft is proportional to the amount he currently owns. We show how the incentives to preempt or...

We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which play- ers can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie (market). We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals radi- cally change with the number of players involved in the game. In...

We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which players can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie (market). We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals radically change with the number of players involved in the game. In the...

Industrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms. Experimental industrial organization therefore faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals firms! This experimental approach is not in line with...

We report results from a Cournot triopoly experiment with different subject pools: German students, Malaysian students, and Malaysian managers. While German students play Nash, we reject the hypothesis that both Malaysian students and managers select the Nash quantity. Moreover, Malaysian...

This paper further develops the standard modelling of information exchange between firms in the presence of cost uncertainty. In order to avoid consistency problems, we replace the normal distribution of the random variables, commonly used because of its convenient mathematical properties, by an...

This study investigates the impact of pre-play communication on the outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments, using both students and managers as subjects. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a 'standardized-communication' and a free-communication device. We find...

In bisherigen Untersuchungen der Auswirkungen aktienkursorientierter Management-Entlohnung auf den Preiswettbewerb wurden Nachfrageschwankungen nicht berücksichtigt. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass Manager auch dann eine größere Kollusionsneigung besitzen als Eigentümer, wenn sich die...