We analyze the transmission of bank-specific liquidity shocks triggered by a credit rating downgrade through the lending channel. Using bank-level data for US Bank Holding Companies, we find that a credit rating downgrade is associated with an immediate and persistent decline in access to...

We use data on the 48 largest multinational banking groups to compare the lending of their 199 foreign subsidiaries during the Great Recession with lending by a benchmark group of 202 domestic banks. Contrary to earlier, more contained, crises, parent banks were not a significant source of...

A defining feature of the banking systems in many transition countries is the large-scale presence of subsidiaries of multinational banks. We use new panel data on the intra-group ownership structure and the balance sheets of 45 of the largest banking groups in the world to analyse what...

This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication between the supervisors is...

The lack of coordination in the resolution of multinational banks has led to demands for the increased centralization of resolution regimes. However, as this paper argues, the anticipation of resolution procedures affects the incentives of host countries to impose capital standards on their...

We model the interaction between two economies where banks exhibit both adverse selection and moral hazard and bank regulators try to resolve these problems. We find that liberalizing bank capital flows between economies reduces total welfare by reducing the average size and efficiency of the...

This paper analyses cooperation among national supervisors in the decision to close a multinational bank. The supervisors are asymmetrically informed and exchange information through ’cheap talk’. It is assumed that they consider domestic welfare only. We show that: (1) the supervisors will...

We use a two-country model to examine how endogenous changes in monitoring intensity and exogenous changes in monitoring efficiency affect multinational-bank lending. First, an endogenous decline in monitoring intensity limits the amount of deposits that banks can attract. This lowers bank...

We use panel data on the intra-group ownership structure and balance sheets of 45 of the largest banking groups from 1992 to 2004 to analyse what determines the credit growth of multinational bank subsidiaries. Both home- and host-country conditions and characteristics of the subsidiaries...

This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication between the supervisors is...