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Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior
Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C.; Heifetz, Aviad - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2009
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620509
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Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2011
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008917373
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Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2011
induced by EFR strategies. PR applies also to generalized extensive-form games which model mutual unawareness of actions … (Heifetz, Meier and Schipper, 2011a). We demonstrate the applicability of PR in the analysis of verifiable communication, and … by Milgrom and Roberts (1986); yet, we also show that under unawareness full unraveling might fail. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008917375
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Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
induced by EFR strategies. PR applies also to generalized extensive-form games which model mutual unawareness of actions … (Heifetz, Meier and Schipper, 2011a). We demonstrate the applicability of PR in the analysis of verifiable communication, and … by Milgrom and Roberts (1986); yet, we also show that under unawareness full unraveling might fail. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004199
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Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 50-68
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearceʼs (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049860
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Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2011
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282093
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Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2009
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282097
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Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005105671
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Communication and Learning
Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his … immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593160
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Communication and Learning
Lagunoff, Roger; Gerardi, Dino; Anderlini, Luca - Georgetown University, Department of Economics - 2008
We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his … immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169616