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Differential Games with Mixed Leadership : The Open-Loop Solution

Basar, Tamer; Bensoussan, Alain; Sethi, Suresh - 2020

This paper introduces the notion of mixed leadership in non-zero-sum differential games, where there is no fixed hierarchy in decision making with respect to the players. Whether a particular player is leader or follower depends on the instrument variable s/he is controlling, and it is possible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046271

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Horner, Johannes - 2015

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029918

Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs Under Conditional Independence

Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2012

This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110135

Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching : The Case of Private Values

Saran, Rene - 2010

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432

Regret Matching with Finite Memory

Saran, Rene - 2010

We consider the regret matching process with finite memory. For general games in normal form, it is shown that any recurrent class of the dynamics must be such that the action profiles that appear in it constitute a closed set under the “same or better reply” correspondence (CUSOBR set) that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142570

Social norms and trust among strangers

Xie, Huan; Lee, Yong-Ju - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 548-555

We study the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocity among a group of strangers via the “contagious strategy” as defined in Kandori (1992). Over an infinite horizon, the players anonymously and randomly meet each other and play a binary trust game. In order to provide the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049814

Social Norms and Trust among Strangers

Xie, Huan; Lee, Yong-Ju - Department of Economics, Concordia University - 2008

We study the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocity among strangers in the infinitely repeated binary trust games. Players are anonymous and interact at randomly determined times. Following Kandori (1992), we show that the social norm of trust and reciprocity can be sustained in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968094

Asymmetric information in the civil wars, the Colombian case

Estrada, Fernando - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

The aim of this paper is to interpret the relationships between information networks and the armed conflict in Colombia. Over a period of paramilitary violence networks of informants were used with a strategic purpose. In fact, the paramilitaries were preparing each slaughter counting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009372512

The effect of group size and cheap talk in the multi-player stag hunt: experimental evidence

Feltovich, Nick; grossman, philip j. - Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, … - 2013

important factors are the size of the group and whether communication is possible. To our knowledge, there has been no … systematic study of the interaction between group size and communication. We report results from an experiment in which groups of … previous studies, communication per se matters less than the content of the communication. Finally, we find significant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010736872

Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection

Jamison, Julian C. - 2012

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a … communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343339