This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of … sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever … parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this …

show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information … potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We …

show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information … potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability of conflict. We …

agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. We model the default option of outright conflict as a … probabilistic contest. Examples of such contests may be international conflict, litigation, and elections. We show, in particular …, that if the loss of surplus from outright conflict is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability …

experiments that our distributed negotiation strategy yields performance sufficiently close to the Nash bargaining solution, and …

I consider two-person bargaining problems in which mechanism is selected at the almost ex ante stage---when there is …

option is a probabilistic conflict and a peaceful agreement is ex ante efficient. Applications include partnership, labor …-management bargaining, pretrial negotiations, and international negotiations. I compute the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms …, the ex ante incentive efficient mechanism, as well as the neutral bargaining solution. I numerically illustrate that the …

language shapes bilateral bargaining. Our dataset extends existing work in two ways: 1) we recruit participants via behavioral …

Most of the economic literature on bargaining has focused on situations where the set of possible outcomes is taken as … before they bargain over which of them is selected. Our objective is to understand how different bargaining institutions … affect the incentives to disclose possible solutions to the bargaining problem, where inefficiency may arise when both …

This paper explores the role of conflict as a bargaining tool. It first presents a simple bargaining model with one …-sided incomplete information. Parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in: A limited conflict that … only introduces delay, or an absolute conflict that terminates the game. The outcomes of both types of confrontation are …