We consider an asymmetric auction setting with two bidders such that the valuation of each bidder has a binary support. We prove that in this context the second price auction yields a higher expected revenue than the first price auction for a broad set of parameter values, although the opposite...

This paper is about a procurement auction setting, introduced in Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), in which suppliers offer differentiated products and the buyer needs to decide whether to reveal or not to the suppliers the own preferences for the various products. We provide some technical...

Partly motivated by the recent antitrust investigations concerning Google, we develop a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets. We analyze incentives for a monopolist to tie its monopolized product with another product in a two-sided market. Tying provides a mechanism to circumvent the...

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices forinterconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges asin the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determinethe access price that network i pays to network j as a linear functionof the...

We study how access pricing affects network competition when consumers'subscription demand is elastic and networks compete with non-linearprices and can use termination-based price discrimination. In the caseof a fixed per minute termination charge, our model generalizes theresults of Gans and...

This article offers an explanation of why firms' downsizing patterns may vary substantially in magnitude and timing, taking the form of one-time massive cuts, waves of layoffs, or zero layoff policies. The key element of this theory is that workers' expectations about their job security affect...