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Explicit and latent authority in hierarchical organizations

Brink, René van den; Gilles, Robert Paul - 2003

In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334333

The prediction value

Koster, Maurice; Kurz, Sascha; Lindner, Ines; Napel, Stefan - 2013

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i's prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225788

Pipeline power : a case study of strategic network investments ; conference paper

Hubert, Franz; Cobanli, Onur - 2014 - This version: January 2014

We use the Shapley value and the nucleolus to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two pipelines, `Nord Stream' and `South Stream', allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. The third...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490647

Sharing the cost of cleaning up a polluted river

Li, Wenzhong; Xu, Genjiu; Brink, René van den - 2021

Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose the class of α-Local Responsibility Sharing methods, which generalizes the Local Responsibility Sharing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012511448

Cooperative strategic games

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287

Reglas igualitarias para los problemas de reparto con referencias múltiples

Sánchez-Sánchez, Francisca J. - In: Revista de métodos cuantitativos para la economía y … 22 (2016), pp. 250-262

We consider the division problems in which a resource must be distributed considering agents' references. We analize this problems in a multidimensional context, we consider that agents have multiple references. For division of the amount available in these situations, we design rules that take...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011588531

Negotiation across multiple issues

Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885

Allocation rules for network games

Jackson, Matthew O. - 2003

Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591365

Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

-solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496

Indirect control and power in mutual control structures

Peters H.J.M.; Karos D. - Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), … - 2013

In a mutual control structure agents exercise control over each other. Typical examples occur in the area of corporate governance firms and investment companies exercise mutual control, in particular by owning each others stocks. In this paper we formulate a general model for such situations....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856553