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Gift exchange vs. repeated interaction as a source of reciprocal behavior

Fahn, Matthias; Schade, Anne; Schüßler, Katharina - 2017

reciprocal behavior - inherent preferences for reciprocity and repeated interaction - the present paper addresses the question if … incentives. Preferences for reciprocity still affect the structure of an employment relationship early on, though, because of two … reasons. First, preferences for reciprocity effectively reduce the employee’s effort costs. Second, they allow to relax the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011712663

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - 2008

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325934

Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269520

Bonus pools and the informativeness principle

Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

Previous work on moral-hazard problems has shown that, under certain conditions, bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk-neutral workers. In our paper we demonstrate that, if a firm employs at least two workers, it may further bene.t from combining worker compensation via a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198505

Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Ulbricht, Robert - 2014

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013057288

Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection

Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015

We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575

Dynamic Moral Hazard Without Commitment

Horner, Johannes - 2015

We study a discrete-time model of repeated moral hazard without commitment. In every period, a principal finances a project, choosing the scale of the project and a contingent payment plan for an agent, who has the opportunity to appropriate the returns of a successful project unbeknownst the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027917

Bayesian Persuasion and Moral Hazard

Boleslavsky, Raphael - 2018

We consider a three-player Bayesian persuasion game in which the sender designs a signal about an unknown state of the world, the agent exerts a private effort that determines the distribution of the underlying state, and the receiver takes an action after observing the signal and its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934709

Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents

Chandrasekher, Madhav - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 1, pp. 11-49

This paper studies an infinite horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674064

Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility : An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019

In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments with verifiable effort. In our experiment, the players endogenously negotiate contracts. In line with contract theory, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105234