We analyse the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective ofefficient aggregation of voters’ private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory,this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between twoalternatives when...

A state, for instance a health state, is characterized by a number of attributes to each of which a level is assigned. A specific collection of numerical values, for instance utilities, for all possible states is called a situation. The main purpose of the paper is to develop a class of methods...

Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2 by 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk...

The classical bankruptcy problem (O''Neill, 1982) is extended by assuming that the agents have non-homogenous preferences over several estates. A special case is the one in which there are finitely many estates and the agents have homogenous preferences, i.e., constant utilities, per estate. In...

We analyze whether noncooperative collusive equilibria are harder to sustain when individual demand levels are not fixed but are able to fluctuate. To do this, we extend a Bertrand type model of price competition to allow for fluctuating market shares when prices are equal. We find that, the...

Bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected utility but can be modelled according to rank dependent utility theory. Under rank dependent utility two factors influence the risk attitude of a decision maker: the utility function and the...

In this paper we study three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points – points below which they consider payoffs to be losses – are endogenous to the...

Two-person noncooperative games with finitely many pure strategies and ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are considered, in which probability distributions resulting from mixed strategies are evaluated according to t-degree stochastic dominance. A t-best reply is a strategy that induces a...

The scope for optimal international coordination of indirect taxes is examined in a macroeconomic game-theoretic framework which encompasses two regionally integrated economies, which have a single goods market. In each country there are tax-financed non-tradeable public goods, while labor is...

We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferableutility. An efficient allocation is undominated if it cannot be improved, in a specific way, bysidepayments changing the allocation or the game. The set of all such allocations is called...