This theoretical paper presents an incentive salience model of intertemporal choice. The model is a variation of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model. Based on the distinction between 'wanting' and 'liking', the paper presents one possible explanation of impulsive choices of smaller sooner...

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy proles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy prole, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each generalized...

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are `close' to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular...

Until now most research in dynamic games focus on models with quadratic objective functions because of practical considerations. But in reality, all problems are not quadratic. In this paper, we solve a differential game where players have non-quadratic preferences. In particular we consider an...

This paper shows that stochastic search algorithms can be used to compute the perfect and proper equilibria of finite games. These type of equilibria use perturbations as a means of escape from local equilibria. Intuitively, there is always a small probability that an agent will select...

This paper presents a simple Ramsey-type model example where two infinitely-living agents have same utility function except for time preference, and shows that equilibrium is indeterminate that is to be interpreted as being non-existent. The issues regarding New Keynesian transversality...

At each moment in time, some alternative from a finite set is selected by a dynamic process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes-vote is decisive for the alternative in question, the alternative is accepted and...

We present a comprehensive study of utility function of the minority game in its efficient regime. We develop an effective description of state of the game. For the payoff function g(x) = sgn(x) we explicitly represent the game as the Markov process and prove the finitness of number of states....

A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players $n$, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every $n$-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient...

Recently, it has been claimed that full-information multiple equilibria in games with strategic complementarities are not robust, because generalizing to allow slightly heterogeneous information implies uniqueness. This paper argues that this global games uniqueness result is itself not robust....