This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives...

Numerous researchers have incorporated labor or credit market frictions within simple neoclassical models to (i) facilitate quick departures from the Arrow-Debreu world, thereby opening up the role for institutions, (ii) inject some realism into their models, and (iii) explain cross country...

In this paper we study the constrained efficiency of a stock market equilibrium under moral hazard.We extend a standard general equilbrium framework (Magill and Quinzii (1999) and (2002)) to allow for a more general initial ownership distribution.We show that the market allocation is constrained...

We consider a model in which the principal-agent relation between inside shareholders and the management affects the firm value.We study the effect of financing the project with risky debt in changing the incentive for a risk-neutral shareholder (the principal) to implement the project-value...

We study a financial network characterized by the presence of depositors, banks and their shareholders. Belonging to a financial network is beneficial for both the depositors and banks' shareholders since the return to investment increases with the number of banks connected. However, the network...

In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a law suit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on bank risk taking, using a large data set of matched bank/borrower information. The results suggest that banks whose...

We explore the role of firms in insuring risk-averse workers.As a device that allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the spot market if workers are suciently risk averse and the firm can base incentive payments on good...

This paper studies the issue of moral hazard in the presence of decentralized international risk sharing.In the model presented, risk sharing is achieved through macro markets (markets in which claims to the GDP of a country can be traded).Moral hazard arises for the following reason: if...