A discussion is given of the problems involved in the formal modeling of the innovation process. The link between innovation and finance is stressed. The nature of how the circular flow of funds is broken and the role of finance in evaluation and control is discussed.

General equilibrium is timeless, and without outside money, the price system is homogeneous of order zero. Some finite horizon strategic market game models are considered with an initial issue of flat money held as an asset. For any arbitrary finite horizon, the solution is time-dependent. In...

The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what...

We prove that a "nondegenerate" m x m coordination game can have at most 2^{M} - 1 Nash equilibria, where M = min(m,n).

A multiperiod exchange economy with gold used both as money and as jewelry is examined in this paper. The existence of Nash equilibria is proved for the market games with finitely many traders as well as the games with a continuum of traders. For market games with a continuum of traders at...