With credence goods consumers cannot judge the quality they receive compared to the quality they need. The needed quality can only be observed by an expert seller who may exploit the information asymmetry by cheating. In recent years various contributions have analyzed the credence goods problem...

In an evolutionary sender–receiver game that describes how signals become associated with objects (Hurford, 1989; Nowak and Krakauer, 1999), the set of evolutionarily stable states coincides with the set of strict Nash strategies—and a language is a strict Nash strategy if and only if it links...

The impact of trade integration of Central and Eastern European economies in European markets has been studied extensively. Often these studies observe quality upgrading of CEEC exports. In this paper we consider three dimensions of quality upgrading: upgrading across industries, upgrading...

We study the determinants of voting outcomes on the provision of public consumption through marginal income taxes in the context of the simple linear growth model. We provide analytical results on how the dynamic politicoeconomic equilibrium maps the economic fundamentals to policies and...

This article introduces technology choice into a Hotelling model of spatial competition. This yields two entry deterrence devices, as well as complex strategic choices for the firms and a rich of industry structure. Depending on cost parameters and market size, firms may choose to over-invest or...

We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where firms use rivalrous but nonexcludable industry-specific capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation depends on utilization, so firms influence the evolution of the capital equipment through more or less intensive...