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This study compares the procurement cost-minimizing and productive efficiency performance of the auction mechanism used by independent system operators (ISOs) in wholesale electricity auction markets in the U.S. with that of a proposed alternative. The current practice allocates energy contracts...
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In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. The "Buy-It-Now" option on eBay is a leading example of an auction with a buy price. This paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in...
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In an auction with a buy price, a seller offers bidders the opportunity to forgo competing in an auction by transacting immediately at a pre-specified fixed price. If a seller has aspirations in the form of a reference price that depends upon the auction's reserve price and buy price, she does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217566
We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize's material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the behavior evolutionarily stable...
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Many real-world conflicts are to some extent determined randomly by noise. The way in which noise is modeled in contest success functions (CSFs) has has important implications both for the possibility of forming cooperative relationships as well as for the features of such relationships. In a...
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We analyze the determinants of tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated contest with noise in the contest success function. Sustaining collusion via Nash reversion strategies is easier the more noise there is, and is more difficult the larger is the contest's prize value. An increase in the...
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