This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to join one of two opposite interest lobbies or not to take part in lobbying activities. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in...

This paper analyzes incentives for cronyism in politics within a political agency model with moral hazard. The analysis focuses on the institutional features, which define contractual and appointment procedures within political organizations. The institutional framework does not allow explicit...

This paper studies the relationship between incumbents' performance and political polarization, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a spatial model of political competition in which the voters use the incumbent's performance in office to update their beliefs about his competence. A...

A child's family structure is a fundamental determinant of future well-being, making it essential to understand how public policies affect the involvement of fathers. In this paper, we exploit a reform of the German parental leave system - which increased mother's income and reduced legal...

A child's family structure is a fundamental determinant of future well-being, making it essential to understand how public policies affect the involvement of fathers. In this paper, we exploit a reform of the German parental leave system which increased mother's income and reduced legal father's...

We develop a theory of information flows and political regime change, when citizens use information and communication technologies (ICTs) for both information acquisition and protest coordination. Governments can respond by obfuscation of citizens' signal or by restricting access to ICTs used...

This paper analyzes voluntary provision of a differentiated public good within an organization. A moderate principal (or a median member of the organization) assigns the public good production to one of two extreme agents. A contributing agent then gets the opportunity to choose a public good...

This paper analyzes the impact of a group-size change on contributing incentives in repeated provision of pure public goods. We develop a model in which the group members interact repeatedly and might be temporarily unable to contribute to the public good production in some periods. We show that...