We study rational expectations equilibrium problems and social optimum problems in infinite horizon spatial economies in the context of a Ramsey type capital accumulation problem with geographical spillovers. We identify sufficient local and global conditions for the emergence (or not) of...

The eductive approach consists of finding solutions consistent with common knowledge of individual rationality and the model. An equilibrium is stable whenever it is the unique outcome consistent with these assumptions. This is a strong stability criterion as it relies on no assumption of prior...

We study rational expectations equilibrium problems and social optimum problems in infinite horizon spatial economies in the context of a Ramsey type capital accumulation problem with geographical spillovers. We identify sufficient local and global conditions for the emergence (or not) of...

We provide a detailed presentation and complete analysis of the sender/receiver Lewis signaling game using a game theory extensive form, decision tree formulation. The analysis employs well established game theory ideas and concepts. We establish the existence of four perfect Bayesian equilibria...

The rational expectations equilibrium has been criticized as an equilibrium concept in market game environments. Such an equilibrium may not exist generically, or it may introduce unrealistic assumptions about an economic agent's knowledge or computational ability. We define a rational...

Competitive agents extract in continuous time from a commons. Capital market access allows them to both save and borrow against their extraction stream. When the commons asset grows more quickly than the privately stored one, multiple equilibria are found for intermediate commons endowments. One...