In an efficient economy, capital should be quickly (re)allocated from declining firms and sectors to more profitable investment opportunities. This process is affected by the concentration of corporate control, which in turn is affected by market institutions. We employ a panel of 12,000 firms...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the efficiency of capital allocation, across levels of ownership, in the aftermath of pro-market reforms in India. Design/methodology/approach – The paper measures investment efficiency using the accelerator principle and examines the effect of...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the efficiency of capital allocation, across levels of ownership, in the aftermath of pro‐market reforms in India. Design/methodology/approach – The paper measures investment efficiency using the accelerator principle and examines the effect...

Previous studies have shown that differences in corporate governance systems and both formal and informal institutions, such as traditions and laws appear to correlate with firm performance. It has been suggested that Scandinavia and South East Asia have similar ownership structures with...

Economic theory tells us that abnormal firm and industry profits will not persist for any significant length of time. Any firm or industry making profits in excess of the normal rate of return will attract entrants and this competitive process will erode profits. However, a substantial amount of...

In a frictionless milieu retentions should have no impact on investment behavior. However, empirical studies typically find that retentions are an important determinant of investment. Managerial discretion and financial constraints are two alternative explanations that have been suggested. This...

In this paper the relation between ownership structure, board composition and firm performance is explored. A panel of Swedish listed firms is used to investigate how board composition affects firm performance. Board heterogeneity is measured as board size, age and gender diversity. The results...

Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control...