The present paper fully characterizes equilibria of a generalized Volunteer's Dilemma game, which is an integration of the volunteer's dilemma game and the step-level public goods game with binary decision. We also examined the explanatory power of a widely accepted model with bounded...

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms "truth bias" reported in...

TThis paper describes a study of the two-sided matching problem with type-specific maximal and minimal quotas with the deferred acceptance mechanism in a student– supervisor assignment. In this problem, both students and supervisors were classified by type according to their affiliations, and...

We study experimentally how (un)selfish lies are reciprocated – or not – in subsequent economic interactions in the labor market. We find that while selfish lies are punished (negative reciprocity), prosocial and altruistic lies are neither punished nor rewarded (lack of positive...

This study explores asymmetric volunteers' dilemma (VOD) games where costs for volunteering is different among players. Diekmann (1993) conjectures that an equilibrium, in which a player with less costs contributes, is more likely to be played if it is risk dominant. We re-examined this...

This is the first book that examines the diverse range of experimental methods currently being used in the social sciences, gathering contributions by working economists engaged in experimentation, as well as by a political scientist, psychologists and philosophers of the social sciences. Until...

We experimentally study how (un)selfish lies are reciprocated—or not—in subsequent economic interactions in a labor market. The experiment was conducted in two sequential stages, where the first stage was a deception game, and the second stage was a gift-exchange game. We find that while...

The centipede game is one of the most celebrated examples of the paradox of backward induction. Experiments of the centipede game have been conducted in various settings: two-person games with linearly increasing payoffs (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992), two-person games with constant-sum payoffs...